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Executive summary
•    Policy-makers, domestically and in international fora, tend to address counter-
terrorism and human-rights protection in terms of competitive goals.
•    In the post-9/11 political climate dominated by security concerns, the suppression 
of the inancing of terrorism is given priority over suspects’ rights. 
•    The current procedures established by the UN Security Council for the freezing of 
funds of terrorist suspects encroach upon several individual rights.
•    The most severe infringement upon the rights of persons targeted by the UN 
sanctions derives from the lack of a secure avenue of appeal. 
•    The denial of access to justice has been fostered for several years by the deference 
of national and regional courts to the UN Security Council.
•    Recent developments at European Union level demonstrate that judicial decisions 
can shape counter-terrorism policies.
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Introduction
The indings reported below emerge from a broader 
research project exploring human rights in the global 
war on terror, The Search for a Fair Balance between 
the Imperative of National Security and the Protection of 
Human Rights in the Recent Caselaw of the European 
Courts concerning the ‘Blacklists’ of Alleged Terrorists, a 
project inanced by the Leverhulme Trust and carried out 
by the author at the Centre on Human Rights in Conlict 
(CHRC) of the University of East London, School of Law.1   
The purpose of this policy paper is to highlight the role 
of the judiciary in reconciling counter-terrorism strategies 
with human rights standards. Indeed, judicial assent 
to the excesses of policy-makers risks deepening the 
human rights crisis caused by the ight against apocalyptic 
terrorism. In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 
terrorist attacks against the United States, the political 
climate has been dominated by security concerns. The 
United States has invoked its right to self-defence and 
declared itself to be engaged in a “war” against terrorism 
of global reach. The condemnation by the UN Security 
Council of any act of terrorism as a threat to international 
peace and security has contributed to the prioritization 
of counter-terrorism strategies worldwide. In this context, 
the collision of anti-terrorist measures with human 
rights has not received the attention it deserves. This is 
particularly the case with regard to the extensive inancial 
measures imposed by the UN Security Council against 
persons and organisations suspected of association with 
terrorism. By virtue of emergency powers pursuant to 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council has 
adopted unprecedented sanctions directly against speciic 
individuals rather than against states. Such sanctions are 
in fact decided in the absence of any connection between 
the individuals and a political regime or territorial entity. 
This innovation has not been accompanied by the creation 
of adequate mechanisms to guarantee respect for human 
rights. The implementation of UN anti-terrorist sanctions 
creates particular concerns about the access of terrorist 
suspects to justice and due process.
 
Critical aspects of the UN 
sanctions procedures 
Scant legal basis and risk of error in listing decisions
Persons suspected of involvement in terrorist activity 
are subject to very comprehensive inancial sanctions, 
pursuant to Security Council resolutions 1267 (1999), 
1333 (2000) and 1390 (2002), as subsequently amended. 
These resolutions place an obligation on states to freeze 
without delay any inancial assets or economic resources 
of the suspects (Taliban or Al-Qaida members or 
supporters), including funds derived from property owned 
or controlled directly or indirectly. The Security Council had 
already used the “targeted sanctions” device starting from 
Resolution 1127 (1997) against UNITA members to ensure 
compliance of political leaderships without affecting 
whole civil populations. However, the use of individual 
sanctions in anti-terror strategy creates the challenge of 
correctly identifying targets.
The list of individuals and corporate entities allegedly 
involved in terrorism is drawn up by the Security Council’s 
“Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee” (also known 
as the “Sanctions Committee 1267”) following proposals 
by member states. No domestic criminal charge or 
conviction is required for listing proposals, and states have 
on occasion based indings of terrorist association on 
partially inaccurate intelligence information. Because the 
mechanism relies on the ‘surprise effect’, a prior hearing 
is not afforded to the suspects. Judgment errors inevitably 
occur: 38 individuals and corporations out of a total of 507 
names have in fact been delisted, but many of them after 
no less than 5 years of proscription, drastically affecting 
their private and professional lives. The addressees of 
the targeted sanctions are not in a position to defend 
themselves, even after the UN listing decision has been 
given effect at domestic level.
Shortcomings of the re-examination procedure
Submission of new information by states informs the 
regular updating of the list by the Sanctions Committee. 
The committee does not engage in a systematic case-
by-case re-examination at pre-determined intervals. Nor 
is there re-examination upon request.  Indeed there is no 
guarantee that a case will be re-examined upon iling a 
delisting petition with the Focal point for delisting within the 
UN Secretariat. This administrative structure, established 
pursuant to Resolution 1730 (2006), merely forwards 
the petitions to the states directly concerned, and, in 
case of inaction by those states, to all other states in the 
Sanctions Committee. The cases are then discussed 
only in the event that a state in the committee decides to 
submit the issue to the committee itself.
Even so, any re-examination is then performed 
by the same body which originally imposed the 
sanction, and involves purely intergovernmental 
consultations; a petitioner is delisted if there 
are no objections from the members of the 
Sanctions Committee. Additionally, individuals 
only have access to a portion of their f i le that 
the designating state considers to be “publicly 
disclosable”. At no time are they entitled to 
take part in the delisting procedures. The 
procedure thus fails to meet the international 
fair trial standards in terms of independence 
and impartiality. The Security Council has not 
envisaged the establishment of an independent 
non-political review body called to examine 
delisting requests. According to a report of 
the Committee’s Analytical Support and Monitoring 
Team in May 2008, such reform is rather unlikely, 
insofar as it would be perceived as eroding the 
Council’s authority. 
The listing and delisting procedures coll ide with 
the fundamental rights of persons suspected 
of association with terrorism. As a report of the 
UN High Commissioner on Human Rights of July 
2008 on Human Rights, Terrorism and Counter-
terrorism argued, “[m]easures should be taken 
to ensure a transparent l isting and de-listing 
process, based on clear criteria, […] as well 
as an effective, accessible and independent 
mechanism of review for the individuals and 
States concerned”. The infringement of the 
rights of few individuals might be viewed as 
a small price to pay for international security, 
especially since financial sanctions do not 
involve the violation of peremptory norms, such 
as the prohibition of torture. However, rule of 
law can be undermined by allowing a range of 
rights be completely overridden by governmental 
security claims.  In particular, the suppression
of judicial guarantees, which have a bearing 
on the enforcement of all other rights, 
can enable abuse. 
Applicability of international human rights law 
The Security Council itself has recognized the 
need to reconcile counter-terrorism with human 
rights obligations. In Resolution 1456 (2003) 
and later resolutions, the Security Council 
has stressed that states must ensure that any 
measures taken to combat terrorism comply 
with all their obligations under international 
law, in particular international human rights, 
refugee, and humanitarian law. Access to justice 
is a widely accepted human right, enshrined in 
many human rights instruments (Article 14 of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, Article 6 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights, Article 8 of the American 
Convention on Human Rights, Article 47 of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union, etc.). As the European Court of Human 
Rights acknowledged in Waite and Kennedy v. 
Germany (1999), the attribution of mandatory 
powers to international organisations cannot 
absolve states of responsibil ity for human 
rights violations. More generally, states remain 
internationally responsible for acts in breach 
of their obligations committed by international 
organisations which they provide with mandatory 
powers, a norm codified by the Draft Articles 
of the International Law Commission on the 
Responsibil ity of International Organisations 
(Article 28). Arguably, implementing Security 
Council resolutions under Chapter VII may entail 
derogations from international due process 
standards. Derogations are indeed permitted 
by human rights treaties in a time of public 
emergency to the extent strictly required by 
the situation. However, the virtually permanent 
state of terrorist alert cannot be viewed as 
an exceptional situation threatening the life 
of the nation. Further, a sanctions regime 
of an indefinite duration cannot constitute 
an emergency measure. There is increasing 
support for the view that Security Council 
resolutions cannot require full derogation from 
the enforcement of the right to a fair hearing. 
Authoritative international jurisprudence 
suggests that the core of due process rights 
might have attained the status of peremptory 
norms (Human Rights Committee, General 
Comment no. 29, 2001; European Court of 
Human Rights, Mamatkulov v. Turkey, 2007). 
This claim is further supported by the fact that 
basic elements of fair trial rights are guaranteed 
even in conflict situations (common Article 3 of 
the 1949 Geneva Conventions).
The assent of national and 
regional tribunals to the 
restriction of rights 
Since the UN mechanism does not provide for 
guaranteed and independent re-examination, it 
is essential to establish how states can comply 
with their obligation to secure due process 
rights, and if domestic avenues of appeal are 
properly afforded. This amounts to enquiring 
whether the national implementation acts 
seeking to give effect to UN resolutions can be 
challenged in a court of law. There is, in fact, no 
such prohibition inherent in the resolutions of the 
Security Council. However, so far the experience 
of domestic lawsuits–approximately 26 cases 
of past and current l it igation, according to the 
reports of the Analytical Support and Monitoring 
Team–suggests that the claimants’ prospects for 
success are very l imited. National tribunals tend 
to find that they lack jurisdiction to hear cases 
dealing with state incorporation of Security 
Council resolutions; alternatively courts may find 
that the Sanctions Committee enjoys exclusive 
competence over the inclusion and removal of 
the names from the list (Brussels Court of First 
Instance, Nabil Sayadi and Patricia Vinck, 2005, 
Tribunal of Milan, Nasco Business Residence 
Center SAS, 2003). 
1   The author gratefully acknowledges the support provided by the Leverhulme Trust in 2008 to the realization of this research project.
TRADING JUSTICE FOR SECURITY? UN ANTI-TERRORISM, DUE PROCESS RIGHTS, AND THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY4
CENTRE ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONFLICT 2009
TRADING JUSTICE FOR SECURITY? UN ANTI-TERRORISM, DUE PROCESS RIGHTS, AND THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY 5
CENTRE ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONFLICT 2009
Similarly, The Court of First Instance of the 
European Communities has declined to review 
European Community acts implementing the 
UN sanctions. The Court of First Instance found 
that the EC acts lawfully pursued compliance 
with UN Charter obligations, which prevail over 
any other obligations of EU states. The court 
also found that EU institutions did not have 
the discretion to alter the contents of the UN 
Security Council resolutions; and further that 
review of such resolutions falls outside the 
court’s jurisdiction (Yusuf and Al-Barakaat, 
2005, Kadi, 2005, Ayadi, 2006, Hassan 2006). 
The court held that its power of review could 
be exercised only if jus cogens violations were 
at stake, insofar as peremptory norms bind 
on all subjects of international law, including 
the bodies of the United Nations. The court 
acknowledged that there is no judicial remedy 
available to the applicants. Nonetheless, it 
found that this lacuna in the judicial protection 
of suspects is not contrary to jus cogens, and 
that their interest to have their case heard was 
outweighed by the essential public interest in the 
maintenance of international peace and security.
Recent developments: 
prospects for judicial oversight 
on UN sanctions
Judicial self-restraint and the unconditional 
primacy of UN resolutions appear less tenable 
after the Kadi appeal judgment of the European 
Court of Justice of 3 September 2008. The 
court found that the EC judicature is competent 
to review any piece of Community legislation, 
including acts aimed at adapting the EC legal 
system to international obligations. It maintained 
that the autonomy of the EC legal order 
entails that the allocation of powers amongst 
institutions (in particular judicial control over EC 
decision-making bodies) cannot be superseded 
by obligations derived from an international 
agreement such as the UN Charter. The court 
further found that when legislation is adopted 
in order to give effect to an international 
agreement, EC institutions must ensure that 
the basic constitutional values of the EC legal 
order–rule of law, human rights–are observed. 
In this sense the court found that the EC 
judicature acts as a ‘constitutional’ court. Thus 
the court established that it was possible to 
review regulations implementing UN Chapter 
VII resolutions, even though the resolutions 
themselves prevail under international law 
over other treaty obligations (including the EC 
and human rights treaties), and in principle 
EU institutions are bound to enforce them. 
The court found that, while some derogations 
from EC and human rights treaties might be 
permissible, they were not permissible for non-
derogable principles of EC law such as human 
rights protection. The court did not find that UN 
resolutions themselves could be reviewed, but 
rather EC implementing legislation, for which EC 
institutions have a certain margin of discretion. 
The court set aside the judgments of the Court 
of First Instance, and annulled the regulation 
challenged by the applicants in so far as it 
concerned them. 
The European Commission has, in response to 
the Kadi appeal ruling, provided the lit igants 
with the UN Sanctions Committee’s narrative 
summaries of reasons for their inclusion on the 
list, and examined their comments. Through 
the passage of Regulation 1190/2008 of 28 
November 2008, the Commission gives an 
account of these developments and reconfirms 
the inclusion of Kadi and Al-Barakaat 
foundation on the list. These events nonetheless 
demonstrate that judicial intervention may 
compel the adjustment of executive proceedings 
(increased transparency and opportunity for 
individuals to argue their case). The European 
Commission on 30 December 2008 also 
published a notice for the attention of the 
persons and entities added to the l ist by the 
latest EC Regulations (announcement 2008/C 
330/09) to advise such persons and entities that 
they may make a request for the grounds for 
their l isting to the Commission, and challenge 
the regulations concerned before the Court 
of First Instance. Thus Regulation 1190/2008 
may be challenged before the Court of First 
Instance, whose power of review of the factual 
basis for l isting is now confirmed by the 
interpretation offered by the ECJ judgment, and 
by the December 2008 notice of the European 
Commission. If the court is not satisfied that the 
statement of the case was sufficiently supported 
by evidence, it may decide that the regulation 
has to be annulled. 
Several policy insights and recommendations 
for future l it igation can be drawn in the l ight of 
these rulings, as courts may better address the 
pitfalls of the UN sanctions regime.
Policy insights
The case against judicial self-restraint 
Domestic and regional courts should 
acknowledge their own jurisdiction over 
measures implementing UN decisions, instead of 
acting as passive spectators of policy-making. 
The wide margin of appreciation afforded to 
executive authorities in addressing the terrorist 
emergency in a multi lateral framework should 
not mean a complete absence of oversight. It is 
inherent in the concept of checks and balances 
that executive action must be at all t imes 
monitored and adjusted by judicial supervision. 
Further, domestic and regional courts need not 
attempt to solve a greater problem than the one 
submitted to their judgment. When the courts 
are asked to decide over the legitimacy of the 
domestic measures, they are requested to apply 
the criteria of the legal system of which they are 
guardians to those specific acts. They are not 
requested to assess the lawfulness of Security 
Council resolutions, and possibly invalidate 
them. Further, the incidental assessment of the 
lawfulness of UN resolutions does not imply 
asserting jurisdiction over such resolutions. 
Jurisdiction presupposes power to quash an act, 
a contention not raised by l it igants. The effects 
of the court’s decision would be limited to the 
specific case, and would not affect the validity of 
the resolution itself.
Depoliticizing judicial deliberation
Judges should not undertake the political 
task of assessing the diplomatic implications 
of the annulment of a domestic measure. If a 
court rules that a national/EC measure is to be 
annulled, polit ical institutions must consider the 
options available: enforce the sanctions despite 
a finding of i l legitimacy, incur international 
responsibil ity for non-compliance with the UN 
decision, or seek political negotiation at UN level 
in order to reach an agreement on the case that 
is compatible with their domestic constitutional 
expectations. It is not for the courts to take such 
political decisions; their adjudicatory role merely 
requires them to accurately establish whether 
an act is lawful, irrespective of the political 
consequences of the ruling. The 2008 decision 
of the European Court of Justice in Kadi to 
maintain the effects of the annulled regulation 
for three additional months il lustrates this 
possibil ity: the court concedes to the political 
institutions the necessary time for them to 
decide the adequate course of action.
Proportionality as balancing criterion 
Domestic courts should apply the proportionality 
test to measures related to international peace 
and security. The adoption of sanctions based 
on fragmentary intell igence material and without 
affording a hearing might be an acceptable tool 
in the fight against the financing of terrorism, 
provided that it is used as a preventive measure 
of short duration. The right of access to a judge 
is not an absolute one, but any restriction must 
remain proportional. Extensive international 
jurisprudence indicates that a fair balance must 
be struck between individual rights and security 
demands even in the presence of terrorist 
threats. The case-law of the European Court of 
Human Rights offers numerous such examples 
(Fox, Campbell and Harley v. UK, 1990; Murray 
v. UK, 1994, Sakik and others v. Turkey, 1997; 
Brannigan and Mcbride v. UK, 2003, Ramirez 
Sanchez v. France, 2006 etc.). It might be 
proportional to allow an affected individual only 
delayed access to an independent review body, 
or to allow proceedings with no public hearing, 
whereas the current sanctions mechanism 
completely impairs the substance of the right to 
due process.
The protracted maintenance of a name on the 
list and the denial of an opportunity for appeal 
at UN level are disproportionate, and domestic 
judges should take this into account when 
assessing the implementation measures. It is 
also not “necessary” to deny re-examination 
by an independent body after the initial 
enforcement of the freezing measures: indeed 
it cannot be seen how affording an avenue of 
appeal would undermine the fight against the 
financing of terrorism, since review is performed 
ex post facto. Furthermore, if security reasons 
actually rendered secrecy necessary after the 
implementation phase, this would appear to be 
at odds with the acknowledgment of the right 
to view inculpatory evidence and challenge 
it in the case of EU autonomous sanctions, 
as established by the Court of First Instance 
(OMPI, 2006, Sison, 2007, Sichting, 2007). In 
fact the access to a court to appeal against a 
UN-derived measure cannot impair security more 
than the exercise of the same right in connection 
to a EU measure.  
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Conclusion
Terrorism is one of the major security threats 
of our times, and needs to be properly 
addressed, but not at the expense of the 
basic values of the international community. 
Courts have the responsibil ity to prevent 
polit ical decision-makers from compromising 
human rights to an unacceptable extent in 
the fight against terrorism. Their reaction 
should guide and stimulate reform of UN 
and domestic procedures, with a view to 
enhancing transparency and access to justice. 
It is therefore essential that domestic and 
supranational tribunals do not abdicate their role 
in shaping international counter-terrorism policy 
in such a way as to ensure its consistency with 
human rights standards.
Key recommendations: 
a summary
National and regional judges should:
•  Acknowledge their competence to review any 
measures impairing fundamental human rights, 
including measures giving effect to Security 
Council Chapter VII resolutions
•  Avoid focusing on the political outcome of 
their decisions and shaping judicial reasoning 
accordingly
•  Assess the legitimacy of the challenged 
measures in the specific case before them, 
rather than considering international security 
objectives as a catch-all justif ication
•  Employ uniform criteria such as the 
proportionality test in analysing terrorism 
measures, irrespective of whether measures 
originate from UN resolutions 
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